It seemed to be a historic ruling for animal welfare when the Supreme Court of India ruled in July 2025 that street dogs are entitled to food. The decision recognised that even voiceless animals must be treated with kindness and respect. But under the pretext of city cleanliness and public security, thousands of stray dogs are being rounded up and removed from Delhi streets. In this inconsistency lies a worse problem: while in theory our laws acknowledge animal rights, in practice they violate them. Thus, the question arises: must animals possess legal capacity to protect their rights in criminal law in case they actually are the owners of such rights?
Animals remain largely treated as property under Indian criminal law. Cruel acts are penalized by the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and connected provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not because the animal is considered a victim. Instead, cruelty is construed as a nuisance or an infringement of public morality. For instance, murder of a dog is treated as destruction of property and not taking a life. Pain experienced by animals is made legally invisible through this strategy based on property. This mindset can be seen in the Delhi relocations, where dogs are seen as obstructions to be eliminated and not as living beings with rights.
The Court had already recognised that animals are entitled to a life of dignity in Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (2014), where it banned Jallikattu and expanded Article 21 to include animals’ right to live free from unnecessary pain. This recognition was later strengthened in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2019), where the Punjab and Haryana High Court declared the entire animal kingdom as legal entities with rights and duties, with humans serving as their guardians. This line of reasoning was reinforced again by the July 2025 judgment, which weighted the right of citizens to safety against the right of stray canines to sustenance. Rather than killing one for the other, this was an attempt at balancing the human and animal interests. The essence of this order is violated directly, however, by taking away dogs from Delhi. The authorities are overlooking the Court's acknowledgment of stray dogs as sentient creatures by removing them instead of providing them with controlled care, feeding grounds, and sterilisation schemes.
The rights of animals would cease to be symbolic if they were accorded legal status in criminal law; instead, they would be represented as victims in court. Because they are sentient beings, animals directly suffer when they are famined, abused, or displaced. They must be granted recognition for their suffering. Standing would ensure that violations, like evictions of dogs in Delhi, could be challenged in court by the animals themselves. There already exist legal guardianship frameworks for children and disabled people; NGOs could perform the same role for animals. On the other hand, as animals cannot speak or give evidence, they would always be represented indirectly. Critics argue that it may make more sense to strictly implement existing animal protection legislation. Decisions such as the stray dog one, however, remain vulnerable to being ignored by state officials in the lack of legal standing.
The guardianship approach, in which trusted boards, non-governmental organizations, or even individuals act as advocates for animals in court, could be a compromise. Mass animal relocation or gross cruelty could be treated as crimes against "persons," and not merely property. Comparative education presents options to us: Ecuador recognized the rights of nature, and New Zealand gave the Whanganui River personhood under the law. If the law can hear the voice of nature, why does it remain deaf to the suffering of animals?
The Supreme Court has already adjudicated the right to food for stray dogs. Yet, the same animals are being removed from Delhi as if they were not entitled to anything. This contradiction illustrates the gap between theoretical acceptances of rights and their practical implementation. Rights of animals could not be so easily ignored if they had a standing in law. Justice for the voiceless demands that the law hear them out even though they cannot speak for themselves.
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